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THE SHERMAN ACT
AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS ASSOCIATIONS' USE
OF ELIGIBILITY RULES
Mark F. Anderson*
Many professional sports associations have a rule that a member
may not participate in a tournament, game, or contest sanctioned or
sponsored by a rival association or promoter. If a member athlete
does compete in a contest in violation of the rule, the association
may remove the offending athlete from the membership list with a
consequent loss of eligibility to compete in association sponsored
competition. The purposes of such an eligibility rule are to suppress
competition from rival leagues and to retain exclusive rights to the
member athletes' performances. Such an arrangement may be
viewed as an attempt to coerce or harm a competing association by
restricting an intermediate third party, a member athlete. The
offending association is effecting a refusal to deal between member
athletes and the rival association by enforcement of the eligibility
rule. The thesis of this article is that use of the eligibility rule is a
secondary boycott (group boycott) illegal per se under the Sherman
Act.
A secondary boycott may be defined as a perpetration of eco-
nomic injury through the use of economic or coercive pressure
on a third party which has or is attempting to do business with
both rival parties-the offending party and that party's rival. In
a wholesale-retail situation a retailer may attempt to injure a
competitor across the street by persuading a common supplier or
a number of suppliers to stop selling to the rival retailer. Such a
case brought the Supreme Court to declare such attempts illegal
per se in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.' Another case
is where a wholesaler attempts to injure a competitor by cutting
off its own sales to retailers buying from both concerns. Such
attempts are also per se illegal under the Sherman Act.2 Replace
"wholesaler" with "manufacturer" and a variation of the second
situation appears. For example, in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples
Gas Light & Coke Co.3 the defendant American Gas Ass'n [herein-
after cited as AGA] whose membership included manufacturers
of gas burners as well as gas suppliers refused to put a "seal of
* J. D., 1967, University of Nebraska. Member of the Nebraska Bar
Association.
359 U.S. 207 (1959).
2 Fashion Originators' Guild of America Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
3 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
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approval" on the plaintiff's ceramic gas burners and instructed AGA
member gas suppliers not to provide gas for use in the unapproved
burners thereby effecting a secondary boycott held illegal per se
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The intermediate third parties
used by the AGA to unfairly compete with the plaintiff burner
manufacturer were the association members who were induced to
refuse to supply gas to units equipped with the unapproved burners
manufactured by the plaintiff. The result was that the plaintiff
could not sell his burners because a competitor was coercing
potential customers not to buy. An apparent evil of AGA's attempts
was its assumption of a governmental role in deciding which burners
were to be approved and which were not as well as enforcement
of the decisions. Such activity has long been condemned since it
"trenches upon the power of the national legislature and violates
the statute."4 General Motors and some of its dealer associations
recently invoked the secondary boycott ban by attempting to stop
discount houses from giving customers a lower price on GM prod-
ucts.5 Some California GM dealers sold cars to discounters who
undercut the usual retail price by significant amounts. As might be
expected GM's economic power was such that the dealers stopped
selling to the discounters once GM decided the sales should cease.
GM's and the dealer's efforts amounted to a secondary boycott since
third parties-other GM dealers that sold to discounters-were
coerced to order to harm the discounters, rivals to the dealers who
did not sell to discounters. GM apparently thought it would lose
money if price competition made serious inroads at the automobile
retailing level. The opinion did not specifically label the arrange-
ment a secondary boycott, but did discuss Klor's at some length.
Imposition of the per se rule in these situations makes it clear
that the degree of market control or the absence of monopoly power
is completely irrelevant. Equally immaterial is the absence of any
substantial anti-competitive effect of the boycott on sellers, buyers,
competitors, or the public.6 Justification on economic or other
grounds is not relevant as in the "rule of reason" cases.
A secondary boycott should be illegal per se because three
parties are involved in a restraint and one, an intermediate party,
is being harmed economically by a group or groups not in a hori-
zontal competing relationship. It seems unfair for the intermediate
third party to be put in such a foreign situation especially when
the other groups possess superior economic power and when a means
4 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899).
5 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).6 Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959, 59 COLTM.
L. Rzv. 843, 864-66 (1959).
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of earning a living is at stake. The object of the boycott, the com-
petitor, is also unfairly harmed because he is effectively cut off from
doing business even though his buyer or seller would willingly
continue trading. In the sports situation an association suspends
or drops a member for competing in a rival association's tournament
or contest. The athlete is then hurt economically in that he cannot
compete in the association to which he originally belonged. If the
athlete does compete in a tournament sponsored by a rival associa-
tion, his activities will be restrained by the offending association.
Commerce is thus restrained whether an athlete competes or not
if the eligibility rule is enforced. The associations usually voice
justifications such as safety or the orderly development of the sport,
but these are more fiction than truth since it appears there is only
a relationship between the eligibility rule and elimination of com-
petition with rival leagues and keeping the price of the athletes
down once they are affiliated with an association.
With an understanding of the problem it should be noted that
courts are reluctant to interfere with the workings of private asso-
ciations. Consequently, one prerequisite to a member athlete going
to court with an antitrust theory is that he must exhaust all avail-
able non-judicial remedies inside the association framework. Once
such remedies are exhausted a court may intervene if an association
has allegedly violated the antitrust laws.7
Another somewhat ancillary question is the possible difficulty
of showing a conspiracy in these cases since one association may be
the only offender. But since professional sports association members
usually must agree to abide by the association's rules when they
join the organization, it would seem that members become part of
a conspiracy to accomplish the rule's purposes especially since no
specific intent to violate section 1 need be found to prove a con-
spiracy.8 If corporate officers may be members of a conspiracy
with their corporation,9 it would seem that members and officers
of an association may be found to be in an illegal agreement with
each other.10
7 See Developments in the Law, 76 HARV. L. REv. 983 (1963).
8 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 n.59 (1940).
9 Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948);
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). But cf. United
States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (perhaps overruled
sub silentio by Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). The
1926 GE case is now under attack by the Justice Department. United
States v. General Electric Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 1 45,066, at 52,633
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1966).
10 Cf. Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
THE SHERMAN ACT
Before examining the secondary boycott-eligibility rule cases
it may be valuable to distinguish them from cases involving so
called "membership" rules. The latter are alleged primary or direct
boycotts between two parties, an athlete either wanting to join
an association or recently ousted from one on the one hand and the
defendant association on the other. Here the alleged boycott is
"primary" because no third party is involved. The courts relegate
these cases to the "rule of reason" and due process standards as
opposed to the secondary boycott being under the per se rule. For
example, in Molinas v. Natl Basketball Ass'n" the court said that
a basketball player who violated the association's anti-betting rules
may be suspended without violating the antitrust laws even though
a restraint is involved. A disciplinary rule against gambling was
said to be "about as reasonable a rule as could be imagined.' 2 In
Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America5 the "rule of
reason" was again applied. This time a Mr. Deesen who had been
expelled from the PGA because of his poor golf scores sought to
be reinstated. He alleged that the PGA had acted in an unreason-
able, arbitrary, and discriminatory manner and had perpetrated
an illegal boycott. But the district court had found that Deesen's
abilities were such that it was not unreasonable to exclude him.
The higher court reviewed the standards and procedures of the
PGA in selecting and discharging members which included test
rounds and a review of the record scores and found them reasonable
as well. The reasonableness of a rule limiting the number of golfers
on the tour is apparent since only a limited number of golfers
may play an eighteen hole course under tournament conditions
during the daylight hours of a single day.14 Finally, in United States
v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 5 the government alleged that the
USTA had unreasonably boycotted applicants wishing to participate
in harness racing. But it was shown that the USTA excluded
only those applicants who had participated in illegal or fraudulent
activities which is obviously a reasonable practice. The significance
of these cases is that an association must act in an arbitrary or dis-
criminatory manner in excluding an applicant before'he would be
able to show an illegal boycott under the Sherman Act. Further,
the per se rule does not apply leaving the field to the "rule of
reason."' 6
11 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
12 Id. at 244.
13 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966).
14 Id. at 172 & n. 9.
15 1960 Trade Cas. if 69,761, at 76,954. (S.D. Ohio May 18 & June 20,
1960).
16 Other cases which support a "rule of reason" in membership situations
include Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957)
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The United States Supreme Court has had one case involving a
secondary boycott by a professional sports association, Radovich v.
Nat'l Football League.17 The more important aspect of the case is
that professional football was held to be subject to the antitrust laws
in spite of baseball's well known immunity. The other aspect is that
Mr. Radovich was an all-pro guard with the Detroit Lions of the
NFL in 1945, but left them for the 1946 and 1947 seasons for the
Los Angeles Dons of the All-America Conference (since disbanded).
In 1948 he was offered a position with an NFL affiliated club, the
San Francisco Clippers of the Pacific Coast League. However the
NFL intervened saying Mr. Radovich was "blacklisted" or ineligible
and that any affiliated club that signed him would be subject to
severe penalties. After the NFL's action Mr. Radovich was not
able to obtain employment in United States professional football.
The complaint was that the NFL was engaged in a conspiracy to
boycott the All-American Conference and its players to destroy it
and strengthen the NFL. As to this part of the case, the Court de-
cided that a cause of action had been stated and that a trial court
should make findings of fact. Presumably the case was settled out
of court. The case involved a secondary boycott since the "blacklist-
ing" was an enforcement of the NFL's eligibility rule which said that
Mr. Radovich was not free to play with a rival club and then return
to the NFL. Under the present law the NFL's rule as applied to
Mr. Radovich should be held illegal per se.
The American Football League, formerly a NFL rival and
potential object of an eligibility rule, merged with the NFL in
1966; Is Congress exempted the merger from possible antitrust
action.' 9 That act did not, however, affect the legality of an eligi-
bility rule invoked by the new league as against any other league.2 0
Before eligibility rules as found in professional baseball may be
examined it is necessary to consider baseball's immunity to the
federal antitrust laws. That rule originated with the remarkable
and Young v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America. 28 F.R.D. 2 (D.D.C.
1961) ("blacklisting" of alleged Communists by movie producers).
17 352 U.S. 445 (1957).is For the fascinating story of how Mr. John Brodie, quarterback of
the San Francisco 49ers, became a millionaire by virtue of the anti-
trust laws, the NFL-AFL merger, and good lawyers see Sports Illus-
trated, August 29, 1966, at 16.19 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1966). By its terms the statute applies only to a
merger of professional football leagues which does not decrease the
number of operating clubs.
20 The conferees stated that they intend "that the new league will com-
mence operations with no greater antitrust immunity than the exist-
ing individual leagues now enjoy." 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
4378 (1966).
THE SHERMAN ACT
decision of Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs,21 which held that baseball was neither com-
merce nor interstate thus destroying federal jurisdiction and giving
rise to the antitrust immunity. Twenty-seven years later a distin-
guished court of appeals reasoned that the interstate commerce
clause had changed since the Federal Baseball case and that base-
ball's interstate activities through radio and television had increased
to the point that the antitrust immunity should be lifted. But that
case, Gardella v. Chandler,22 did not reach the Supreme Court. In
1953 the Court did hear a challenge to the immunity rule, but
refused to overrule Federal Baseball giving deference instead to the
doctrine of stare decisis.2 The Court left Congress to change the
rule, but no change has been made.
Baseball contracts commonly contain the so called reserve
clause, an eligibility rule. Under it a player may not quit the club
he originally signed with and play for another one willing to pay
him more money. His services may be disposed of only by the
club that owns him by trading, selling, or releasing him. Without
the clause or other binding contractual obligations, a player is able
to sell himself to the highest bidder. The clause is enforceable since
other clubs must respect the rule or face league repercussions. The
obvious effect of the clause is to depress players' salaries. Sup-
porters of the clause claim that the richest clubs would soon siphon
off the the best talent if it were a bidder's market, a rich get richer
and poor get poorer argument. The most severe test of the vitality
of the reserve clause was a suit by Daniel L. Gardella, an outfielder
under contract to play exclusively with the New York Giants. Mr.
Gardella along with nine other players made the mistake of play-
ing winter baseball with a Mexican league prior to the 1946
season. They were all given five year suspensions by the commis-
sioner of baseball for violating the reserve clause-they became
ineligible to play baseball in the United States. Gardella v. Chand-
ler24 represented clearance of the antitrust immunity barrier. The
case had been sent back to the trial court and was ready for trial
when Mr. Gardella's suspension was lifted and the case dropped.25
Consequently the eligibility rule question was never reached
although Judge Jerome Frank did state that he believed the clause
illegal.26 Another case involving a victim of the operation of the
21 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
22 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
23 Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
24 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cr. 1949).
25 N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1949, at 30, col. 1. (late city ed.).
20 172 F.2d at 404.
88 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 47, NO. 1 (1968)
reserve clause was Toolson v. New York Yankees.27 However, the
question was not reached there either because of the Court's deci-
sion as to immunity. It seems clear that the reserve clause will
be quickly declared illegal once the immunity is removed. Such
a decision would be correct on the basis of the per se illegality of
secondary boycotts-the two major U.S. leagues force the best play-
ers to boycott other U.S. and foreign leagues. In addition, a single
player is made to boycott other clubs within the major leagues and
vice versa.
Professional bowling leagues are currently providing the most
fertile area for secondary boycott litigation. In Washington State
Bowling Proprietors Ass'n, v. Pacific Lanes, Inc.,28 a private treble
damage suit under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff
was an owner-operator of a bowling establishment in Tacoma,
Washington. The defendants included owners of other bowling
establishments in Tacoma as well as the local and state bowling
associations to which the defendant owners belonged. A national
bowling association was named a co-conspirator, but was not a
defendant. The jury found that the defendants had agreed to con-
duct, sponsor, and sanction bowling tournaments open only to
those persons who restricted their league and tournament bowling
to defendant-member establishments and that any person who
bowled in non-member establishments would become ineligible to
bowl in member tournaments. The jury also found both a con-
spiracy to restrain trade under section 1 and an attempt to mono-
polize commerce in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. As
a result of the unlawful acts the plaintiff was awarded substantial
damages sustained upon appeal. An initial issue in the case on
appeal was whether group boycott (secondary boycott) rules apply
only to commercial boycotts, those against "other traders," or
whether they would apply to boycotts against bowling organiza-
tions as well. This does not sound like much of a distinction and
the court said there was not any for purposes of boycott law.
Bowling establishments are certainly engaged in commerce just as
are "traders."
The Justice Department has filed a civil complaint against the
Bowling Proprietors' Association of America charging that the
association's eligibility rules have been coercively used for over a
decade.29 The rules provide that no bowler will be allowed to
27 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
28 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1966).
29 5 TRADE REG. REP. 1 45,064, at 52,564 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 1964). A con-
sent judgment was entered on May 19, 1967, requiring the BPAA to
revoke some league and tournament eligibility rules and by laws. 5
TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.), 1 12,105 at 83,966 (S.D.N.Y. May
19, 1967).
THE SHERMAN ACT
participate in any of the tournaments sponsored or conducted by
the defendant unless the bowler confines all of his league bowling
to defendant establishments. It is apparent that the association
uses the secondary boycott as a method of improving its owner
members' position in the market. An additional boycott aspect of
this case seems to be that the eligibility rule cuts against both rival
bowling associations and member owners' competitors in the local
markets. If that is fact, the reason for applying the per se rule
in secondary boycott cases applies even more so-two different
types of competitors are the objects of the eligibility rule restraint.
Another illustration of an eligibility rule's effects is Paul Gold-
smith v. United States Automobile Club.3 0 Mr. Goldsmith, a pro-
fessional racing driver, was a member of the defendant club.
USAC's principal function is the sanctioning of automobile racing
events in the United States by contract with promoters of such
events. At the time of the litigation USAC's rules included one ban-
ning member participation in any competition not sanctioned by
USAC unless permission was obtained from the association. The
same rule flatly stated that permission would not be granted to race
in a non-sanctioned event "in competition with a United States Auto
Club sanctioned event." Another rule stated that any person who
violated the rules may be punished by disqualification, fine, suspen-
sion, or exclusion. On November 3, 1963, Mr. Goldsmith participated
in the "Golden State 400," a race sponsored by one of USAC's com-
petitors, the National Association of Stock Car Auto Racing [NAS-
CAR], held in Riverside, California. USAC had warned Mr. Gold-
smith and other USAC licensed drivers including Dan Gurney and
Parnelli Jones that the "400" was non-sanctioned and participation
in the race would be a violation of the eligibility rule. Other drivers
withdrew, but Mr. Goldsmith raced and received a one year sus-
pension from USAC. He later attempted to enter the "Indianapolis
500" sanctioned by USAC, but his application was rejected because
of his suspension. His next step was a request for an injunction in
the federal district court in Indianapolis, but it was denied on the
grounds, inter alia, that USAC had not engaged in a conspiracy,
that it cannot conspire with itself or with its officers and employees
acting within their authority, and that the eligibility rule is reason-
able and reasonably related to assuring safety in USAC events.
If a conspiracy had been present, it seems that the eligibility rule
should have been held to be illegal per se. It is difficult to see the
relationship between USAC's eligibility rule and any safety con-
30 Paul Goldsmith v. United States Auto Club, Inc., No. 64-C-214 (S..D.
Ind. June 3, 1964). (Facts about the United States Auto Club are
taken from the court's findings of fact).
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sideration; the nature of the arrangement under the Sherman Act
dictates that any reasonableness is irrelevant anyway. USAC ob-
viously has an interest in competing with NASCAR and the eligi-
bility rule is a means of forcing the type of drivers who participate
in the "Indianapolis 500" to boycott USAC's competitors. The
advantages of this arrangement to USAC on the one hand and dis-
advantage to NASCAR are obvious-the drivers who draw specta-
tors and sponsors stay with USAC even if NASCAR is willing to
pay the drivers more money. The drivers are not able to negotiate
for a higher purse and so trade is restrained. The public loses since
they only see the top drivers when and where USAC chooses to
sanction a race. It would seem that the path is clear for a USAC
member to challenge the eligibility rule and expect to win on a
secondary boycott theory.
One continuing threat to court action to stop the operation of
eligibility rules is Congressional action. Many bills have been intro-
duced over the last few years to exempt professional sports from
the federal antitrust laws.31 One bill would have exempted employ-
ment, selection, or eligibility of players; or the reservation, selec-
tion, or assignment of player contracts. 32 It passed the Senate, but
not the House. Such a bill would be unfortunate since it would
depress player salaries, frustrate a player's attempts to move to
another club for any reason including money, hurt minor competing
leagues attempting to become established, and discourage persons
thinking of forming a new sports association in a given sport. For
the same reasons Congress should remove baseball's antitrust
immunity and let the "reserve clause" be declared illegal by the
courts.
The per se rule is apparently becoming established as a means
of disposing of secondary boycott-eligibility rule cases. The main
problem seems to be recognizing an eligibility rule case as a second-
ary boycott in disguise. Once recognized, the per se rule should
make the opinion short and decision easy.
31 E.g. H.R. 10378, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
32 S. 950, 89th Con., 1st Sess. (1965). S. Rep. No. 462, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess- (1965) deals with S. 950.
